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ABSTRACT 
In this article authors present an application of spatial processing methods for GPS spoofing detection and mitigation. In 
the first part of this article, a spoofing detection method, based on phase delay measurements, is proposed. Accuracy 
and precision of phase delay estimation is assessed for various qualities of received signal. Spoofing detection 
thresholds are determined. Efficiency of this method is evaluated in terms of probability of false alarm and probability of 
detection when 4 to 8 GPS signals are received. It is shown that the probability of spoofing detection is greater than 99 
percent if carrier-to-noise ratio is at least 46 dBHz. The second part of the article presents a GPS spoofing mitigation 
method which uses spatial filtering (null-steering) for excision of undesired signals. Performance of this method is 
analyzed in various conditions. Attenuation of undesired signals is estimated to be at least 60 dB when their signal-to-
noise ratio is high. Furthermore, statistical analysis of the spatial filtering influence on the availability of true signals is 
provided. Eventually, a concept of practical anti-spoofing system implementation is proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Global Positioning System receivers are present 
in many devices, starting from chips installed in 
simple trackers and smartphones [1], through 
professional geodetic devices, to high-dynamics 
receivers used in aviation and space vehicles. 
Apart from it, GPS is used to provide accurate 
synchronization to telecommunication networks 
and power grids. For a large number of these 
applications integrity of GPS signals and 
correctness of navigation data is critical, in order 
to compute accurate position, velocity and time 
(PVT) information. However, it must be 
remembered that GPS signals may be easily 
jammed even by signals of power equal to 
several Watts, depending on the distance from 
jammer [2]. 
 
GPS spoofing is a more sophisticated technique 
than jamming, since in this case the interference 
imitates the true navigation signals arriving from 
GPS satellites. Without any protective features, a 
GPS receiver is vulnerable to spoofing. The 
signals emitted by spoofer (spoofing device) not 
only jam the true signals but also cause the  
 
 
estimation of incorrect PVT values. Advanced 
receivers perform the Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) algorithm. However, if 
the parameters and navigation data of spoofing 
signals comply with the current orbital parameters, 
RAIM may not detect the lack of integrity. It is 
especially probable in scenarios when spoofer 
initially simulates the true position of receiver and 
gradually deviates it to the wrong one. 
 
It is clear that additional features are required to 
detect and mitigate GPS spoofing. Many methods 
of spoofing detection are proposed [3], such as: 
 
- detecting unusual values or changes of power-
related parameters: carrier-to-noise density ratio, 
absolute received signal power, power variations, 
L1/L2 band power ratio, 
 
- monitoring time-related parameters: length of 
interval between phase transitions, delay between 
signals transmitted on different frequencies, 
 
- analysis of sample values at correlator output, 
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- spatial processing – detecting multiple signals with 
the same direction of arrival using a multi-antenna 
receiver or a mobile single-antenna receiver, 
 
- cryptographic protection, 
 
- using hybrid navigation systems (GNSS+INS) [4], 
and many others. Nevertheless each of them has 
some drawbacks, concerning either increased 
complexity and cost or effectiveness limited to a 
certain set of spoofing scenarios. For example, 
one of suggested methods is based on checking 
whether the received signals are modulated with 
military P(Y) code, which is usually absent in 
spoofing signals [5]. Despite being effective, this 
solution uses two receivers and requires that one 
of them is protected from spoofing, which is not 
always possible. 
 
In general, effectiveness of spoofing detection 
methods depends on the sophistication level of 
spoofer. For example, carrier-to-noise density 
detection algorithms may be defeated through 
adding an artificial white noise and changing the 
relative instantaneous amplitudes of fake signals. 
 
The most sophisticated spoofers adjust the PRN 
code phase and carrier phase to match those of 
true signals arriving to a target receiver [6]. The 
usage of such device is limited, since it requires 
the knowledge of precise distance between the 
spoofer and the attacked receiver. While it may 
seem to be possible in certain situations, then 
using multiple scattered antennas to transmit 
synchronized signals, in order to imitate spatial 
separation of satellites, is very unlikely. This is the 
reason why the spoofing detection methods based 
on spatial processing are highly robust. The 
relative directions of arrival of signals from different 
space vehicles (SVs) are likely to be the most 
reliable factors during distinction between genuine 
and fake GPS signals. The undisputed advantage 
of such solutions is the inherent direction of arrival 
(DoA) estimation, results of which may be used to 
filter out the spoofing signal through beamforming 
or null steering. 
 
To restore the correct operation of a spoofed GPS 
receiver, spoofing mitigation procedures are 
applied. Various approaches to solve this problem 
may be found in the literature [3]. Vestigial Signal 
Detection method, used for spoofing mitigation, 
subtracts the local code and carrier replicas from 
buffered samples of composite received signal and 
then repeats the acquisition in order to detect and 
acquire suppressed signals from GPS satellites. 
When using this method, an assumption is made 
that the power of false signal is significantly higher 
than the power of true signal. It may not be fulfilled 
when the receiver is far from the spoofer. In such 
case, the true signals may be discarded in favor of 
the ones used for spoofing. Moreover, if spoofer’s 
signals have considerably higher power than 
desired signals, the latter may not be detected, 
due to quantization error. 
 
Another countermeasure, Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM), compares pseudorange 
measurements and discards the outliers resulting 
from presence of false signals. This approach may 
fail in scenarios, where spoofer is synchronized with 
true signals or when all the true signals are jammed, 
making it impossible to compare the measurements. 
 
The most robust methods of GPS spoofing 
detection and mitigation seems to be the ones 
which use spatial processing. The necessity of 
antenna array usage results in increased 
complexity of the receiver, but it may be 
acceptable when robustness is the main criterion. 
 
Spatial processing methods which use multiple 
antennas for reception of GNSS signals have 
already been proposed in various approaches in 
the last few years [7], [8]. Their applications are 
mostly related to jamming and interference 
mitigation. However, the performance of these 
spatial algorithms in various conditions is usually 
insufficiently investigated. In subsequent chapters 
of this article authors present an example solution 
which applies the antenna array processing for 
GPS spoofing detection and mitigation. 
Effectiveness of this method is also assessed. 
 
2. Spatial processing 
 
There are various ways of obtaining the direction of 
arrival or angle of arrival estimate. They include: 
mechanically or electronically controlledreception 
pattern antennas, phase interferometry, subspace-
based methods such as MUSIC or ESPRIT and 
others. Most of these possibilities require additional 
signal processing blocks. In GNSS receivers 
available on the market, signal processing blocks 
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are usually integrated into one chip without any 
external access to samples of received signals. That 
is why the best way to assess the performance of 
DoA estimation is to use a software receiver with an 
analog front-end. Off-the-shelf chip-scale GPS front 
ends are available, yet they usually provide only one 
or two bit output sample resolution, which is 
sufficient for GPS signal reception, but it may be too 
low for DoA application. It is better to use a separate 
preamplifier and an analog down converter followed 
by a high-resolution multi-channel digitizer. 
 
Subspace-based methods of DoA estimation are 
computationally efficient and accurate, however 
they require relatively high Signal-to-Noise Ratio, 
which is not the case of GPS signals hidden 
almost 20dB below noise floor. Nevertheless, they 
may be applied to the post-correlation signals [9]. 
The other approach, selected by authors of this 
article, is to measure the received signals’ phase 
shifts which may be used to estimate theDoA 
through phase interferometry. 
 
Direction of arrival corresponds to the phase 
delay differences of signals at the outputs of 
receiving antenna array elements. The level of 
ambiguity in resolving DoA is highly dependent 
on array geometry and characteristics of array 
elements (sensors). 
 
Since spoofing signals are practically always 
radiated from a single source, they arrive to the 
receiver from the same direction, no matter if it is 
a line-of-sight or a reflected signal. On the other 
hand, genuine signals from GPS satellites arrive 
from different directions within the whole 
hemisphere, assuming the clear view of the sky. 
Basing on this assumption, GPS spoofing is 
detected when multiple received signals have 
the same or very similar DoAs. 
 
Azimuth and elevation, which represent two-
dimensional DOAs, are non-linear functions of 
phase delays. That is why a relation between the 
phase delay estimation error and the DoA 
estimation error depends on relative orientation 
between source of signal and receiving antenna. 
Thus for GPS spoofing detection it is more 
reliable to compare the phase delays than to 
compare the actual DoAs. 
 
3. Simulation model 
 
In this paragraph the model of received GPS 
signals as well as the model of the antenna array 
are described. They are necessary assumptions to 
assess the performance of proposed counter-
spoofing methods. 
 
3.1 Signal model 
 
In order to determine the effectiveness of 
proposed spoofing detection method, a simulation 
model was developed. This model assumes that 
transmitted signals are only subject to the additive 
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and their delays 
are proportional to the distances between the 
source of signal and particular elements of the 
antenna array. 
 
Signals received by multiple antenna elements 
may be described as follows: 
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where i=1,...,M is the array element number, Pi is 
the received power of i-th signal, τi is the total 
delay of transmission from the signal source to 
thei-th element, c is the pseudorandom C/A code 
sequence, d is the navigation message data 
sequence, fc is carrier frequency and ni is the 
additive noise at i-th element. 
 
One of the antenna array elements is selected to 
be the reference. Only the signals received 
through this element pass the full signal 
processing path of GPS receiver, that is acquisition 
and tracking phase, including C/A code phase and 
carrier phase estimation.  Acquisition procedure, 
as well as code and carrier tracking loops are 
implemented in software, according to algorithms 
presented in [10]. The remaining blocks of GPS 
receiver, i.e. pseudorange estimation, navigation 
message decoding etc. are not involved in 
spoofing detection procedure. 
 
Signals from the rest of the outputs of antenna 
array are correlated with the same local replica 
which is used for correlation with the reference 
signal. Since the relative delays between signals 
are less than one L1 carrier period, which is over  
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1500 times shorter than duration of one C/A code 
chip, the code phases of corresponding signals at 
all antenna elements are practically the same. 
 
Multiplying the received signal with a C/A code 
replica provides the carrier modulated with 
navigation data. The next operation is correlation 
with complex carrier which provides the 
information about the phase shift: 
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where Zi is the complex sample at correlator 
output. Phase of carrier replica is adjusted to 
match the phase of the reference signal from the 
first sensor. Thus, the rest of computed phase 
shifts are the DoA-related phase delays between 
the first and the other array elements. 
 
3.2 Antenna array model 
 
While selecting an antenna array configuration 
for DoA estimation, many factors have to be 
taken into consideration. First, the number of 
sensors. Two sensors may be used for phase 
delay discrimination [7] and for limited estimation 
of the angle of arrival. However, when using 
such an array, the same phase shifts are 
possible for baseline-symmetrical azimuths. 
Adding the third non-in-line element to the array 
eliminates the ambiguity of the azimuth. Even 
more elements are necessary for unambiguous 
two-dimensional DoA estimation. On the other 
hand the number of sensors must not be too 
high. There are limitations on the size of the 
antenna array. When the distance between 
sensors is larger than half of the wavelength, 
phase ambiguity occurs. A large number of 
closely-spaced sensors increases mutual 
coupling. Also more signal processing paths are 
required in this case, which increases hardware 
and computational complexity. 
 
Besides the number of elements, their 
arrangement is important. The most popular are 
planar arrangements: uniform linear/rectangular 
array (ULA,URA) [11], as well as circular array or 
circular array with additional central sensor. Non- 
 
planar arrays may be beneficial for 2D DoA 
estimation [12]. 
 
Four-sensor uniform circular array was selected for 
purpose of described simulation research. 
Configuration of elements is presented in Fig. 1. 
Spacing d between neighboring elements is equal 
to 0.45 wavelength.  It is less than half wavelength 
in order to decrease the level of phase ambiguity 
when the noisy signal impinges on the array from 
direction parallel to any of the array’s baselines. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed configuration  
of the antenna array elements. 
 
As all of the elements are located on a plane which 
is parallel to the ground, there exists an uncertainty 
whether the elevation is positive or negative. 
However, in case of GPS antennas, signals are 
received only from directions with positive 
elevations, so estimated elevation angles may be 
mapped to range from 0 to 90 degrees. 
 
Coupling between sensors, which depends on 
specific types of antenna elements, is not taken 
into consideration in this model. It may have a 
significant influence on amplitude and phase of 
received signals, thus should be investigated in 
practical implementations. 
 
4. Simulation results 
 
Preliminary performance assessment of the 
described spoofing detection and mitigation 
methods was made basing on the results of the 
following simulations. 
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4.1 Mean and RMS value of phase delay 
estimation error 
 
A series of simulations were conducted in order to 
assess the accuracy and precision of phase delay 
estimation with various signal-to-noise ratios. In 
each scenario two parameters were measured for 
phase delays: mean value offset and root-mean-
square error (RMSE). 
 
Since the power spectral density of GPS signals is 
below the noise floor and all the signals share the 
same frequency band, it is difficult to estimate the 
wideband SNR value. In this case, carrier to noise 
density ratio (C/N0) is used to assess the received 
signal quality. It is calculated after correlation, 
when the pseudorandom C/A code and the 
navigation data are removed from carrier. The 
relation between signal-to-noise ratio and C/N0 in 
civilian GPS is: 
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where B is the GPS C/A signal bandwidth equal to 
2.046 MHz. Simulations were  performed for C/N0 
from 35dBHz to 60dBHz, as it is a range of values 
mostly occurring during reception of real GPS 
signals. Four uncorrelated realizations of AWGN 
were added to relatively delayed GPS waveforms 
to obtain desired SNR. To check whether it is the 
only source of signal distortion, C/N0 was 
estimated using three different procedures 
described in [13],[14]: Variance Summing method, 
Beaulieu’s method and Moments method. For 
each method, the difference between theoretical 
and measured value in range from 40 dBHz to 60 
dBHz was less than 0.5 dB. Measured C/N0 error 
values are presented in Fig. 2. 
 
Phase delay measurements are calculated after 
correlation with 1ms integration time. They are 
contained in-π to π range by default. If the 
nominal phase delays are close to the borders of 
this range, phase wrapping may cause the 
increase in RMS error and mean value offset. 
That is why the computed phase delays are 
additionally mapped into -2π to 0 and 0 to 2π 
ranges. For each pair of array elements the  
 
range with the lowest variance within last 100ms 
is selected to provide the samples used to 
assess accuracy and precision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The charts presenting mean value offset and 
RMS error as a function of C/N0 are shown in 
Figs. 3 and 4respectively. For each C/N0 value, 
10 iterations were executed and the average 
value was taken. In each iteration 5 seconds of 
signal were analyzed. Simulations were 
conducted for various directions of arrival and 
each time the results were very similar, which 
means that phase delay error is independentfrom 
nominal phase delay. 
 
As may be seen, the offset of mean value 
oscillates around zero value in entire C/N0 range. 
It proves that AWGN does not decrease the 
accuracy of phase estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Carrier-to-noise ratio estimation error. 
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Figure 3. Mean phase delay offset from nominal value. 
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The RMS error is the same for all three pairs of 
array elements. Eq. 4 describes the least squares 
approximation of RMSEφ as a function of C/N0. 
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4.2 Phase delay error distribution 
 
Distribution of phase delay difference error must be 
known in order to evaluate the probability of 
spoofing detection, as well as the probability of false 
alarm. Statistical analysis was conducted on the 
samples of phase delay error to decide whether it 
follows a normal distribution. A sample histogram of 
phase delay estimation error is presented in Fig. 5. 
As may be seen, it resembles the Gaussian bell 
curve. However, to make sure that it is in fact 
normal, another two tests were carried out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the obtained phase delay estimation error 
values were plotted on a normal test plot. The 
distribution is assumed to be normal, if the 
samples coincide with the diagonal line. As may be 
seen in Fig. 6, the coincidence is very good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another test was the calculation of the Anderson-
Darling statistic  in order to numerically assess 
the goodness of fit. For significance level α=0.05, 
it is said that the distribution is normal if the 
statistic value is less than 0.752. Calculations 
were done for integer values of C/N0 in range 
from 40 dBHz to 60 dBHz. The results are shown 
in Fig. 7. All of the values do not exceed the 
threshold, so it may be assumed that the phase 
delay error is distributed normally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Probability of spoofing detection 
 
In ideal conditions, all spoofing signals would 
cause the same phase delays. In the noisy 
 
 
Figure 4. Root mean square error of phase delay. 
 
 
Figure 5. Sample histogram of phase 
delay estimation error (C/N0 = 60 dBHz). 
 
 
Figure 6. Normal test plot of phase delay error. 
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Figure 7. Anderson-Darling  
statistic of phase delay error. 
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channel they are not exactly the same. Presence 
of spoofing might be detected by checking whether 
the phase delay differences of multiple GPS 
signals are below the specific threshold. 
Knowledge about possible phase delay error is 
important for selection of such threshold levels 
which would maximize the probability of detection. 
 
Incorrect GPS spoofing detection, called false 
alarm, may occur in situations when multiple true 
satellite signals are received from similar 
directions and all phase delay differences are 
below predefined threshold. In order to 
determine how large these differences may be, 
the positions of all GPS satellites within 24 hours 
period were computed with 1 minute interval. For 
each time interval, a number (from four to eight) 
of visible satellites, with most similar directions 
of arrival, were selected and nominal values of 
phase delay differences were calculated. 
Assuming that probability of false alarm Pfais not 
greater than 10-4, threshold level Φth may be 
evaluated from: 
 
 
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where Φij is the j-th difference of phase delays 
between first and i-th element of antenna array, 
N=(K-1)·K/2 and K is the considered number of 
spoofing signals (fake satellites). 
 
If phase delays are normal random variables with 
variance σ2≈RMSEφ2, then: 
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where Φij0 are the true differences of phase delays, 
i.e. without error caused by noise. 
 
Threshold levels were calculated for C/N0 range 
from 35dBHz to 60dBHz. Receiving antenna 
positions were set to 0, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 90 
degrees north and 0 degrees of longitude, 
according to WGS84 coordinates. Final 
threshold level was selected for each case as 
the minimum from values obtained for different 
positions of the receiver. Results, for various 
numbers of satellites involved in spoofing, are 
shown in Fig. 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After determination of the detection thresholds, 
probability of spoofing detection Pd was estimated 
using expression similar to Eq. 6: 
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Probabilities of detection, as functions of C/N0 
and number of satellites, are presented in Fig. 9. 
For C/N0 greater than 47 dBHz practically every 
presence of spoofing will be detected, irrespective 
to the number of fake satellites. To provide at 
least 99% probability of detection with 4 to 8 
satellites, carrier-to-noise ratio must not be less 
than 46, 41 and 39, 38 and 36 dBHz respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Threshold levels for phase delay difference. 
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Figure 9. Probability of spoofing detection. 
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4.4 Performance of null-steering for spoofing 
mitigation 
 
After information about relative phase delays of 
spoofing signal is obtained, null-steering is applied to 
suppress all the signals arriving from particular 
direction. The optimum complex weight vector w for 
null-steering using M-element antenna array is: 
 
T
MiM
i
M »¼
º«¬
ª '' )exp(1
1...),exp(
1
1,1 ,12,1 MMw  
 
      (8) 
 
where Δφ1,m is the unwanted signal phase delay 
between the first (reference) and m-th element of 
array [16]. Filtering process is performed according 
to the following expression: 
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where sfilt(t) is the antenna array output signal 
and sm(t) is the signal received through m-th 
sensor of array. 
 
Complex signal y(t) at the output of proposed 
antenna array may evaluated using Eq, 10, 
assuming unitary power of arriving signal: 
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where ψ is the DoA azimuth angle, θ is the DoA 
elevation angle, φc(t) is carrier phase at reference 
sensor, wm is the m-th element of weight vector, 
d1,m is distance between first and m-th array 
element and λ is wavelength. Elements of array 
are assumed to be isotropic. Array gain is 
calculated in the following way: 
 
   ^ `> @³ T dttwyTwG 0 2,,,Re1,, T\T\                         (12) 
 
where T is equal to one carrier period. 
 
Pattern described by Eq. 12 refers to the signal 
component located exactly at L1 frequency. Since 
the dimensions of antenna array are related to a 
particular wavelength, the attenuation varies for 
different frequency components of received 
signals. In addition, this variation is a function of 
DoA. For example, if elevation angle is equal to 
90°, all relative phase delays are zero and high 
attenuation is constant in whole frequency range. 
Largest differences of attenuation occur for low 
elevation angles and azimuth angles close to 0° 
and 180°. Fig. 10.shows the example frequency 
characteristics of the selected array in 2.046 MHz 
band around L1 frequency, at 0◦ DoA azimuth. As 
may be seen, center frequency component is 
completely eliminated from output signal. 
Attenuation on the borders of analyzed frequency 
range is much lower. Assuming that spectrum of 
noisy spoofer’s signal is flat, total attenuation 
GGPS in 2.046 MHz band, at 0° elevation of arrival 
and 0° or 180° azimuth of arrival, is equal to 
about –60 dB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase estimation error causes changes in shape 
of antenna array reception pattern. Erroneous 
phase delays are not connected with specific DoA, 
so the pattern does not have a distinct null. In 
other words, presence of noise and interference 
decreases the attenuation of all signals arriving 
from the direction of spoofing source. To constrain 
a null in direction close to DoA of spoofing signal, 
the best-fit DoA is calculated for inaccurate phase 
delays. Error function is selected to be the mean-
square difference of phase delays: 
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Figure 10. Frequency characteristics  
of proposed antenna array. 
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where Δφ(ψ,θ) is a phase delay connected with 
specific DoA while Δφ* is the phase delay 
estimated in presence of noise. Gradient 
optimization is used to evaluate the best-fit DoA. It 
involves an iterative procedure which may be 
described in the following way: 
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where k is iteration index and β is a real constant 
coefficient which affects the convergence of the 
procedure and the number of iterations required to 
achieve acceptable error value. Initial null direction is 
set to {ψ0,θ0}=[0°, 45°]. Eventually, new set of phase 
delays is calculated, based on resulting DoA. These 
phase delays, instead of those primarily estimated, 
are used to form the array weight vector as in Eq. 8. 
Average attenuation of spoofing signals, arriving from 
0 azimuth and 0 elevation, before and after 
optimization of weight vectors, is presented in Fig. 11. 
Results, for each C/N0 value, were obtained by 
averaging 1000 attenuation values calculated for 
normally distributed random phase delays. It may be 
seen that the optimization significantly increases the 
attenuation of undesired signals. As C/N0 increases, 
attenuation approaches the –60 dB value, which is 
the limit for signals impinging on array of proposed 
configuration from mentioned DoA. On the other 
hand, if no optimization is performed, the attenuation 
of spoofing signals is not satisfactory, especially for 
low C/N0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Influence of null-steering on reception of true 
GPS signals 
 
Null-steering towards source of spoofing signal 
results not only in excision of this unwanted 
signal, but may also have negative influence on 
quality of desired, true signals, arriving from 
GPS satellites. A ttenuation of satellite signals 
may be estimated from Eq. 10, considering wide 
bandwidth. Relative noise power between input 
and output of the array must be also taken into 
account to calculate changes in signal-to-noise 
ratio caused by spatial filtering. Since the 
ambient noise does not have a one specific 
source in space, its attenuation Gn depends only 
on the weights vector and is expressed in the 
following way: 
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Simulation research was conducted to estimate the 
probability that SNR decrease exceeds acceptable 
level for given number of visible satellites. This level 
depends on expected SNR in receiver’s location 
without spoofing activity. Positions of all operating 
satellites were computed, basing on GPS almanac, 
within 24-hour period with 1 minute interval. GPS 
receiver’s positions were set to 0°, 15°, 30°, 45°, 60°, 
75° and 90° North, 0° of longitude with 0 m height, 
according to WGS-84 coordinates. DoAs and 
corresponding changes of SNR were computed for 
all of satellites’ and receiver’s positions. DoAs of 
spoofer’s signals, represented by pairs of azimuth 
and elevation angles, were selected respectively in 
ranges from 0° to 360° and from 0° to 90°, with 5° 
step. For each of analyzed acceptable SNR 
decrease levels, a cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) was calculated as the minimum of CDFs 
estimated for all receiver’s positions. Resultant 
probability distribution was evaluated through 
differentiation of this CDF. Statistical representation 
of obtained results is shown in Fig. 12. If 12 dB SNR 
decreaseis acceptable, full satellite visibility is most 
likely. On the other hand, when quality of true signals 
is poor and only 3 dB SNR decrease is tolerated, 
number of excised signals is larger, with 2 being the 
most probable value. From practical point of view, 
information about the number of signals possible to 
receive is more important than about the absolute 
number of excised signals, since the total number of  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean attenuation of spoofer’s  
signals in presence of noise. 
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visible satellites varies with time and receiver’s 
position. Thus, another investigation was performed 
in order to evaluate the probabilities that certain 
number of satellite signals are possible to be 
received when null-steering is enabled. Results of 
this analysis are presented in Fig. 13. Probability that 
at least 4 satellites are visible is over 95 %, if 
acceptable SNR decrease is less than –1 dB. To 
provide over 95 % probability of at least 5, 6 and 7 
visible satellites ΔSNR thresholds must be set to –2 
dB, –4 dB and –7 dB, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Concept of the anti-spoofing system 
 
In order to verify the results obtained from 
simulations, a proof-of-concept of the proposed 
anti-spoofing system is going to be implemented. 
The general concept is presented in Fig. 14. 
Signals from the outputs of a four-element 
antenna array are amplified and downconverted 
from RF to IF in an analogue front-end which 
also performs automatic gain control. IF signals 
at 2.5 MHz are sampled in the data acquisition 
board installed in a high-end PC. The following 
stages of signal processing are performed in 
dedicated software. Amplified and bandpass 
filtered RF signals are transmitted form the front 
end to a null-steering board which consists of 
four signal paths, eachincluding a wideband 
phase shifter and a voltage controlled 
attenuator. Values of attenuation and phase shift 
are set according to spoofing signals phase 
delays estimated in software. Next, the signal 
which is a sum of four phase shifted component 
signals is provided to a commercial GPS 
receiver, so that the result of spoofing mitigation 
may be assessed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The functions which are realized in software are 
depicted in form of a block diagram in Fig. 15. 
First, four signals which are sampled in DAQ 
board with 8.192MHz sampling frequency are 
written to a long buffer in random access 
memory. This buffer can contain 60 seconds of 
signal and after that period the oldest data are 
replaced with currently acquired samples. The 
samples from buffer may be written to a file as a 
reference signal for post-processing. Next, GPS 
signals acquisition procedure is realized based 
on samples acquired in the first signal path. 
Acquisition function returns the number of 
received signals, satellite identification numbers, 
coarse carrier Doppler shifts and C/A code 
phase shifts. These parameters, along with 
signal samples, are passed to GPS signal 
tracking loop, which follows the changes of 
Doppler frequency and phase of C/A code. 
Carrier phase is also estimated so the coherent 
carrier replica may be generated locally. 
 
 
Figure 12. Probability of true signals’  
excision due to null steering. 
 
 
Figure 13. Probability that not less than  
given number of satellites are visible. 
 
 
Figure 14. Block scheme of the anti-spoofing system. 
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Carrier phase shifts in the second, third and fourth 
signal paths are estimated through multiplication of 
samples with this replica and C/A code. Next step 
is the calculation of phase delays between the 
signals from the first and the other signal paths. 
After that, differences of respective phase delays  
are calculated for all of the visible satellites. 
Spoofing detection procedure is executed basing 
on these data. If all of the phase delay differences 
are below the threshold, it is decided that multiple 
signals arrive from the same direction, which 
means that spoofing is present. 
 
In case of spoofing detection, estimated phase 
delays are passed to the null-steering board which 
filters out the unwanted signals. In addition, 
software null steering may be performed using the 
same phase delays. The samples of filtered 
signals are stored in a file for post-processing. 
Samples of signals before and after null-steering 
may be fed to a software GPS receiver in order to 
verify the effectiveness of spoofing mitigation. 
 
The presented block diagrams describe a new 
concept which is currently being practically 
implemented. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
GPS spoofing is a serious threat and, in fact, it is 
not very difficult to realize such an attack. It is clear 
that robust countermeasures, composed of 
detection and mitigation algorithms, are required. 
 
Spatial signal processing, which takes advantage 
of multi-antenna reception is one of the most 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
effective ways of distinguishing between true and 
fake GPS signals. 
 
Results of simulations presented in this article 
show that comparison of phase delays may be 
used for GPS spoofing detection. It provides low 
probability of false alarm and high probability of 
detection, unless only four signals with low signal-
to-noise ratios are received. 
 
Additive white Gaussian noise was assumed in 
simulation as the only interference with received 
GPS signals. Other types of disturbance, such as 
narrowband signals or selective fading are spread 
during correlation and result in raised noise 
spectral density. Probability of detection in 
presence of interference of any type may be 
estimated if C/N0 is known. 
 
There is a possibility to extend the presented 
method of spoofing detection to create a combined 
detection and mitigation solution. Estimated phase 
delays of spoofing signals may be used to 
calculate complex weight vector. This vector 
shapes the antenna array pattern in a way that a 
null is pointed towards source of spoofing signal, 
without rejecting true signals from satellites. 
 
This article proves that spatial filtering may be 
used as a robust way of GPS spoofing mitigation. 
Proposed optimization of array weights provides 
high attenuation of undesired signals. Furthermore, 
large probability of at least four useful satellite 
visibility is sustained, unless their nominal signal-
to-noise ratio is low in receiver’s location. Spatial 
processing is also beneficial, as it may be  
 
 
 
Figure 15. Block scheme of the software part of the system. 
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successfully used in combined spoofing detection 
and mitigation solution. It is also worth mentioning 
that proposed approach does not require any 
additional information about the antenna’s attitude, 
since the reference frame is array-fixed. 
 
During this research authors assumed that false 
signals arrive only from one direction at a time. 
Some additional investigations should be done 
to evaluate the performance of proposed 
methods in a multipath environment, where 
replicas of undesired signals may arrive from 
different directions. 
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